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GARY SHAPIRO

Hegel's

Dialectic

of

I. ARTISTIC MEANING: INTENTION
OR INTERPRETATION?
WHATEVERELSEthey are, works of art are

intentional human products. Our responses
to such works are understandings and interpretations. That the works are or may be
physical objects, cultural symptoms, or commodities and that audiences may be shocked,
sexually excited, or politically instructed
are irrelevant to the cognitive poles of intention and interpretation; these make art
philosophically significant and differentiate
it from that which has no meaning, despite
possible similarities in apparent structure
or emotional effect. Cognitivist theories of
art usually tend to focus rather exclusively
on just one of the two poles which characterize art so conceived - the artist's intention or the interpretation given by audience or critics. Philosophers with idealistic
commitments have often argued, as do
Croce and Collingwood, that the artist's
experience, understood as a unique expression, is not merely the meaning of the work
of art, but the work itself. New Critics object to any reference to the artist's intentions as tending to distort the sense of "the
text itself." The structure of disputes in
aesthetics, to a large extent, consists either of
conflicts within these tendencies or between
them.1 So intentionalists may very well disagree as to whether intentions are general
or unique, conscious or unconscious. Those
who reject intentionalism

but retain a cog-

nitive conception of interpretation may disGARY SHAPIRO is associatE professor of philosophy
at The University of Kansas.

Artistic

Meaning

agree as to the proper criteria of interpretation and the degree to which a work
admits multiple significations. These family
quarrels can sometimes be shelved for polemics against the "intentional fallacy" or
for charges that a work sundered from its
author's intention must be radically ambiguous. Such disputes can lead to rather
extreme and uncomfortable claims. One
such extreme holds that the meaning of a
work is simply identical with the author's
intention, the audience's role being simply
to identify themselves with the artist's
thought. The complement of this view is
that which takes as paradigms of art those
independently existing works which encourage us to discover a multiplicity of meanings, interpretations, and possibilities. The
choice between individual solitary expression or a celebration of ambiguities is not a
happy one.
One way of dealing with the apparently deep inconsistency of these approaches
is to adopt an empirical point of view which
rejects the exclusive validity of either tendency. It may be suggested, quite plausibly,
that works vary in the extent to which their
makers have authority over their meaning
or in the degree to which their texture or
structure is open and consequently admits
a variety of interpretations. I believe that
this fact offers only a partial solution to the
dilemmas posed above. For intentions and
interpretations seem to play a fundamental
role in art which tempt us to seek some intelligible connection between them. If it
is a fact that works of different styles, artists,
or periods may be found which exemplify
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one or the other of the theories discussed by what follows: Hegel's reconstruction of
above, the task for aesthetics should be to Greek art is only apparently chronological;
exhibit this as a reasoned fact.
its true order is a logical sequence of inIt is an interesting and (as far as I can creasingly adequate attempts to realize a
tell) little-noticed virtue of Hegel's discus- purpose. This is, of course, the pattern of
sion of art in the Phenomenology of Mind Hegel's Phenomenology and to some extent
that it aims at such a reasoned account of of his entire system; chronological order
the roles of intention and interpretation in tends to but does not exactly coincide with
art. In brief, Hegel recognizes that insofar teleological order. That the art in question
as it is cognitive, art revolves around these is religious should not appear strange when
two poles. Rather than focus on one of we recall that for Hegel religion is a figurathese to the exclusion of the other, however, tive way of attaining self-knowledge. In fact
Hegel tells a story, or more accurately, ra- the particular development with which we
tionally reconstructs the philosophical his- will be concerned shows a progress from the
tory of art. The story has a place for the naive religious consciousness which takes
happy moment of union between the artist the gods to be independent subjects to the
and his audience, for the confusion of more philosophical awareness that our
variant meanings guessed into a work by a thought about the gods is a form of reflecpublic alienated from the producer, and tion on ourselves.
for a variety of intermediate stages. The
Like some other writers on aesthetics
key to the story is Hegel's view that the Hegel begins by distinguishing the artist
kinds of questions raised about artistic from the craftsman or artisan. The artisan
meaning are not simply external to art, who produces symbolic objects with abstract
and therefore limited to the discipline of form (such as pyramids and obelisks) is like
philosophical aesthetics. He suggests that the artist insofar as what he produces serves
art itself involves the tendency to become no obvious external purpose, as do the
aware of the problems which arise from the products of the cook or the carpenter. Yet
gap between intention and interpretation; he differs from the artist because he acts
with this awareness it searches for a solution more instinctively and mechanically than
having the form of an identity of artist's and the latter. Where the artisan simply follows
audience's meaning through the medium a pattern without much thought, the artist
of the work. While one-sided theories tend constructs or invents a pattern. In Platonic
to enshrine the identity or ambiguity de- terms, it is not that the artisan is closer to
tected in a particular artistic phase, Hegel the form of the bed than the painter; it is
suggests a rational historical analysis which rather that the artistically painted bed is
the imaginative construction of a bed ratlher
demonstrates their interconnection.
Before examining the details of this ideal than the slavish imitation of a pattern.
story as Hegel tells it in his chapter on Despite some apparent similarities, Hegel's
"The Religion of Art" (Kunstreligion), contrast of artist and craftsman also differs
some clarifications may be useful. First, I in some respects from that which Collingwill treat Hegel's discussion somewhat selec- wood has made current. For Collingwood
tively, dealing with those elements in it the artist is free from the mechanical imwhich are related to questions of artistic position of form on matter only to the exmeaning. Second, there is an apparent tent to which he expresses an absolutely
problem posed by Hegel's limitation of his unique emotion, disregarding all concepts
analysis to classical Greek art with a reli- and ideas which might govern his product.2
gious interest. The ensuing discussion will According to Hegel, the artist is a kind of
show that Hegel was largely correct in conceptual thinker; he does have a specithinking that the attitudes of Greek artists fiable aim, as does the craftsman, but his
and audiences have quasi-universal signifi- aim is reflectively chosen. His activity is
cance. In the meantime these points should not invariably determined by his concepts;
be kept in mind, which will be confirmed but this is because his concepts are subject
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to progressive clarification and determination, not because he escapes the conceptual
for the emotional.
Much is built into Hegel's original characterization of the artist. His activity is said
to be intentional and self-conscious; he is
beyond the world of feeling and emotion
which both expressionist theory and popular opinion tend to confuse with art, just
as he is distinct from the unreflective craftsman. As an artist he is already a kind of
thinker; so Hegel might suggest that all art
is "conceptual art," genuine art being constituted by intentional activity capable of
reflective modification. What will such an
artist aim at doing? Hegel suggests that he
will attempt to depict the gods, and we
are immediately tempted to think that he
is either guilty of a false generalization from
the Greek experience or that he has illegitimately imposed his own belief that all rational activity aims at knowledge of the
divine (or Absolute) on the great variety
of artistic modes and styles. Whether the
divine is the ultimate subject of all judgment is indeed a large question; by discussing Hegel's attempt to articulate this
insight in his treatment of art, it may appear surprisingly plausible and subtle. If
we recall that the gods are to a large extent
alienated and externalized visions of ourselves, Hegel's point becomes a bit clearer.
The artist is a self-conscious being, no
longer content with a life which would consist only of instinctual and social routines.
He will be most true to himself wlien he
attempts to manifest or express his selfconsciousness. But why should the gods
be the necessary medium for such selfexpression? According to Hegel they will
not always be necessary - not even, as we
shall see, in art-religion - but they do
represent the logically simplest form in
which the artist's self-knowledge will take
shape. And the activity of this simplest
form exhibits our tendency to recognize
human traits elsewhere before we recognize
them in ourselves. The artist has to learn
self-expression, just as children learn to articulate their own states of mind by commenting on the (projected or actual) mental
life of others (including such surrogates as

25

animals and dolls). Hegel's reconstruction
of the phases of artistic activity attempts to
exhibit the ideal order of such self-education.
Coincidentally it will become clear why the
artist's self-education will involve the establishment of an artistic meaning accessible
to himself and his audience.3
II.

FROM ABSTRACT SEPARATION
TO COMIC IDENTITY
A. The abstract work of art.
The simplest artist (already far removed
from the craftsman by his self-consciousness)
aims at exhibiting the features of the gods.
Now although he will tend to presuppose
that the gods are distinct from himself and
his audience, the artist must embody their
ideal self-consciousness; and the only forms
of such embodiment with which he is familiar are the human manifestations of selfconsciousness. So the initial result of representing the gods in a plastic medium will
be, typically, the statue of an idealized
human being. Here the point is not that
sculpture is the first art-form to arise in a
historical sequence, but that a static, nonverbal representation will be the most
primitive means of realizing art's purpose.
However, as soon as the artist reflects on
his achievement, he is struck by its inadequacy. The inadequacy which the artist detects in his own work is the vast discrepancy
between

the object

-

e.g. the sculpture--

and that which it is meant to represent or
embody. Hegel draws attention to the difference by saying that such works of art
are "abstract"; they are not living or selfconscious either in the way that their putative object is or, more significantly, in the
way that their creators and audience are.
The failure of abstract art lies in its separation of artist, art-work, and audience. Structurally the defect of such art is that for
either the artist or the audience, an experience of this actually triadic situation tends
to be dyadic. The audience sees some meaning in the work but attempts to understand
the work as an independent object. Such
understanding is necessarily indefinite and
indeterminate, for there can be no meaning
without purpose or intention, and by neg-
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lecting the artist the audience attempts to
discover impossibly free-floating meanings.
(Although Hegel does not remark on the
matter specifically, he may have in mind
the Greek tendency to regard the plastic
artist as a mere craftsman, inferior both because of his manual labor and his lack of
theoretical activity.)
Those who refuse to accept dialectical
accounts of historical matters may plausibly
claim that the artist might not reflect, but
proceed indefinitely to create works which
he would reject if he ever were in a more
reflective mood. Now Hegel will probably
agree that such an unreflective continuation would be logically possible. What he
would insist on are: (1) since the artist is
a self-conscious agent, there is an intrinsic
probability that such reflection will occur at
some point in the practice of art, and
(2) despite the possibility of repeating
poorly conceived attempts indefinitely, once
critical reflection intervenes the problematics of the situation and the nature of
self-consciousness allow us to observe the
rational nature of the criticism and the
resulting modification of the initial intention. These are the crucial aspects of Hegel's
analysis, not simply of art, but of the various attitudes of mind which he traces
throughout the Phenomenology, and they
help explain the interplay of contingent
and rational factors in his account of human activity.
Hegel brings out the incoherence of abstract art by noting the opposition of its
internal and external sides. For a work to
be meaningful and significant it must have
an "inner" or intentional meaning of its
own. Yet abstract works are "external"
insofar as they give the impression of being
relatively independent objects or surfaces.
For both artist and audience, the completed
work is unhappily externalized: for the
artist, because it is radically unlike his own
activity, and, for the audience, because it
cannot serve as the basis of the inner meaning which they wish to discover in it. The
upshot is the discovery by the artist that
"the work is, therefore, not by itself really
an animated thing; it is a whole only when
its process of coming to be is taken along

with it." 4 Even this restriction

must be

strengthened; for Hegel's full analysis requires that the satisfactory work is one
whose reception or understanding must also
be "taken along with it."
The unhappiness and disappointment
produced by abstract art suggest the perennial problems of false understanding which
provoke philosophical reflections on intention and interpretation. In this sense
there are some significant analogies between
Hegel's sense of "abstract"art and the more
modern use of the term; and recent minimal
art seems to be a paradigm case of what
Hegel has in mind. For the latter reduces
art to its minimal abstract or formal situation, inviting speculation about how such
a skeletal structure can support the flesh
of meaning. The audience's joy in such a
work rings false to the artist for, as Hegel
says, he sees that it has overlooked "the pain
of his self-discipline and the pain of production,

. . . the exertion and strain of his

own toil." 5
The key to Hegel's analysis is the view
that the history of art exhibits a rational
development which aims at overcoming the
incoherence of its abstract form. This
orientation gives his account of certain artforms an apparently schematic structure.
Yet this structure is derived from the three
components of the artistic situationthe
artist, the work, and the audience. Even
within abstract art, which is dominated by
the work or the objective point of view,
Hegel discerns the hymn and the cult as
alternative ways of resolving the problem
of artistic meaning. The lack of explicit
self-consciousness in these forms, however,
lays them open to the same objections as
sculpture. Hegel distinguishes two other
major artistic modes in addition to the
abstract; these are living and spiritual art.
Their general structure derives from art's
aim at a totality which will include a work
to mediate between artist's intention and
audience's interpretation. Such mediation
occurs in a paradigmatic fashion when, as
in art-religion, the object of artistic production is insight into self-consciousness. For
the general form and phases of the solution
can then be anticipated: the self-conscious
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artist attempts in his work to exhibit the
general nature of self-consciousness to an
audience which is also self-conscious. As the
object of art becomes increasingly selfconscious, the boundaries between it and
the artist or audience tend to dissolve.
Hegel himself points to this, somewhat
enigmatically, when he says:
As the work comes closer to itself in the coming
together of its aspects, there comes about thereby
at the same time the other fact, that the work
comes closer to the self-consciousness performing
it, and that the latter attains in the work knowledge of itself as it truly is.6

B. The living work of art.
Since the abstract work of art is handicapped by the sheerly external nature of
the art-work, the artist can be tempted to
collapse the distinction between himself
and the object. He does this simply by
shaping himself into an aesthetic object.
What he does or is is the work of art. The
strangeness in Hegel's own time of counting
a Bacchic revel or the Olympic games as
works of art has largely vanished in an
artistic world filled with happenings, living
theater, and various more or less bizzare
ways in which the artist becomes his own
exhibit. In the Bacchic revel, as conceived
both by Hegel and its modern practitioners,
there is an indulgence in unrestricted, spontaneous feeling which is also represented
as an identity with the gods (or, in modern
language, participation in a higher state of
consciousness). By assuming the role of
artistic object, the artists or performers have
in fact liberated themselves from thle constraints of form and the discipline of artistic
work. What they mean is just what they
do; it requires neither to be thought out
nor to be interpreted from their works.
However, this apparent liberation is not as
complete as it claims to be; because its
content is immediate natural enthusiasm
it is subject to the instability of all unobjectified feeling. While performing, the
artists are filled with meaning (which they
take to be divine) but to a spectator (or to
themselves, wlhen the mood has passed) the
meaning is not apparent. Like the naive
advocate of sense-certainty who thinks of a

27
"now" or a "here" as the fullest possible
meaning, the art of emotional celebration
passes from imagined fullness to abysmal
emptiness as soon as it ceases to be
immediate.

If stability of meaning cannot be reached
this way, however, it may possibly be gained
by importing some regularity and balance
into the activity of the subjective artist.
He now sees that his activity "must produce
a work which confronts it as the statue
stands over against the enthusiasm of the
artist in the previous case." However, in
the subjective (or "living") mode of art
which is now operative this work cannot
be a lifeless statue but "man . . . himself as

the figure elaborated and moulded for perfectly free movement."7 We might think
here not only of the Olympic games but of
various (choreographed) forms of dance.
The problem with both forms of subjective
art is that they exhibit a dialectic like that
found in the objective phase. Each variety
aims at a kind of wholeness or totality of
meaning. But by placing himself directly
in tlhe position of the art-work the artist
must end either in a purely transient activity or as a beautiful, but detached object.
Each is a one-sided parody of the life of
mind which involves both movement and
rest. The artist must find a way of objectifying self-consciousness (which the revel
fails to do) while not losing the selfconsciousness of the object (as does the
game or dance). Hegel analyzes both the
problem and its solution in an important
passage which describes both the last possible form of living art and the minimal
conception of spiritual art:
In the case of the Bacchic revelling enthusiasm
the self is beside itself; in bodily beauty of
form it is spiritual being that is outside itself.
The dim obscurity of consciousness in the one
case and its wild stammering utterance, must
be taken up into the transparent existence of
the latter, and the clear but spiritless form of
the latter into the emotional inwardness of the
former. The perfect element in which the inwardness is as external as the externality is
inward, is once again language.8

Language is a uniquely privileged medium,
according to Hegel, because it resolves the
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tension of internal meaning and external
vehicle which until now has sabotaged all
of the artist's efforts to produce a totality
of meaning. Here Hegel is considering not
the emotional expression of the hymn, or
the cryptic utterance of the oracle, but the
clear, universal, and deliberately employedl
language of the poet. The poet says just
what he means and he does so in a series
of words which can be repeated and examined. Language is an external embodiment
of internal meaning which obviously suggests a speaker and at least a potential
listener. Language cannot be mistaken for
an independently existing object, as can
the statue, or for a mindless performance,
as can the movements of the dancer or
gymnast. It offers the possibility of an
identity of meaning in artist, work, and
audience, for thought and understanding
are their expression in speech; they are not,
as in the previous forms of art, conceived
of as peripherally attached to the work
from different directions by artist and
audience.
At the same time, the introduction of
language also does away with some of the
exclusively national or ethnic characteristics
which tend to make works of art idiosyncratic or esoteric. Statues, for example, must
represent certain physical types; but in
using language (assumed to be translatable
and not merely a dialect), art has "laid
aside the particular impressions, the special
tones and chords of that nature which it,
as the actual spirit of the nation includes."'9
Hegel does not mean to suggest that all
traces of particularity are destroyed in linguistic art, but rather that the search for a
totality of meaning will tend to give up
those specific and particular aspects of art
which are restrictive of universal meaning.
If Hegel is right, then he has answered the
criticism that lie has falsely generalized
from a particular artistic tradition. For he
is attempting to show that the particular
aims and clharacteristics of Greek art are
such that they have, when pursued, the
dialectical consequence of raising themselves to universality. It is not simply a
fact, for Hegel, as it was for many of his
contemporaries, that Greek art Ilad a uni-

I RO

versal appeal; rather its history itself exhibits a rational development toward such
universality.

C. The spiritual work of art.
In terms of the dialectic of intention
and interpretation, the special importance
which Hegel attaches to the spiritual work
of art should be clear. The poetry he has
in mind is that in which the three elements

of the artistic situation, i.e., the artist, the
work, and the audience are all distinctively
self-conscious. The middle term of this relationship now consists in the depiction or
performance of human actions. A poet uses
the self-conscious medium of language and
creates images of human action to an audience who can (and ultimately will) succeed in partially identifying themselves
with

both

poet and characters.

Because

there is no premature attempt to collapse
artist's meaning and audience's understanding into an intuitive or emotional unity,
this identity is stable and articulate; it is
a developed and structured identity which
Hegel in his Logic calls the "true" identity
as distinct

from the trivial identity

of a

physical object, event, or feeling with
itself. 10

Hegel is claiming that art can find a
solution to the problem of artistic meaning
and understanding. Our own experience of
literary art and criticism, lhowever, may
lead us to wonder whether in fact this solution is excessively formalistic. For although
it seems to outline a way in which artistic
meaning can overcome the apparent dichotomy of intention and interpretation, we all
know that literary works are notoriously
subject to divergent interpretations; and
works of literary art have been the paradigm cases in modern disputes about the
"intentional fallacy" or in discussions of
the "hermeneutic circle." Hegel, as I understand him, would not deny any of this.
His point is not that all which we call
poetry is specially suited to overcome the
problems of authorial intention and multiple meaning, but that within poetry a way
of dissolving such problems arises out of
poetry's own goals and materials. Two considerations make this view somewhat plau-
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sible: (1) Hegel has in mind poetry which
is quite clearly addressed to an audience;
he is excluding at this point the esoteric
hymns and oracles which purport to be
sheer communions with or reports from the
gods. The dyadic structure of such poetry
makes it merely "abstract" and not "spiritual" art. (2) It may be that literary works
figure so prominently in discussions of
artistic meaning and criteria of interpretation precisely because, while they promise
more articulate significance than do visual
or musical works, we are puzzled to encounter problems of meaning even in their case.
The way in which Hegel presents the
varieties of poetry shows his intention to
demonstrate that poetry can in fact attain
a totality of meaning as opposed to simply
aiming at it. Like the other forms of art,
poetry realizes itself through a series of
progressively more complex and adequate
forms. In the epic, it is a communication
by a singer to an audience by means of
represented human actions. Yet at such a
minimal level the poet will continue to
think of true self-consciousness as bound
up with the gods. So in effect tlhe human
characters of the epic form the "middle
term" of two "syllogisms." They connect
mere humans (the epic singer and his audience) with the gods by means of their
heroic extraordinary nature (as in the Iliad
such heroes are typically of at least partially divine descent). They also connect
the understanding of the audience with the
poet's intention. To the extent that the
content of the epic involves a different kind
of mediating (between human and divine)
tlhan does its form (between human and
human) it will exhibit inconsistencies which
show that it is not a fully adequate way of
realizing the totality of artistic meaning.
Far from being an uncritical admirer of
Greek art, Hegel's critique of Homer's inconsistencies is more radical than Socrates'
charges of poetic ignorance or second-level
imitating. The key to the inconsistencies
lies in the fact that humans must act in the
epic, suggesting that human activity is not
simply an accessory instrument in clarifying the nature of thinigs but part of that
very nature. This emphasis on action de-
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feats the purpose of the epic "syllogism"
which is supposed to mediate between human and divine self-consciousness. For the
singer represents himself as passively inspired by the Muse and does not look at
his own activity as genuine work. While
the singer acts without seeming to, the gods
seem to act but are in fact the butts of an
unconscious comedy. The gods are the ostensible agents of the epic with control over
earthly events; yet this condition renders
their often frantic concern for the doings of
humans unintelligible. The gods exert
themselves over what they might perform
without effort and they rely on humans to
give them an occupation and diversion. It
is the gods who are actually dependent on
humans. The gods also retain the duality
of particularity and universality which has
been prominent in the preceding dialectic
of art. On the one hand they are universal
self-consciousness, free of ordinary human
constraints; on the other they have a specific identity or character which links them
with specific inclinations toward love or
violence, for example. Thus the gods stand
in a "relation to others, which, in virtue of
the opposition it involves, is one of strife,
is a comic self-forgetfulness of their eternal
nature."11

Artistically

the epic recognizes

this by introducing fate which is an "unintelligible void" to which the gods "stand
related selfless and sorrowing, for these
determinate natures do not find themselves
in this purely formal necessity."12
There is an intricate process of reduplication occurring at this point in the Phethe unhappy consciousness
nomenology:
previously attributed to men unsuccessfully
seeking union with the divine has been internalized by the gods themselves. As humans become more conscious of themselves
through artistic presentations of the gods
the latter are fated to travel that "highway
of despair" from which the humans are
emerging. Hegel indicates that the epic
singer is in some ways superior to the gods
by pointing out that whereas the singer's
task is recollection (Erinnerung) the gods
are comically self-forgetful. Recollection or
re-internalization is in fact the fundamental
principle of the Phenomenology.
By this
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process of internalization what is otherwise
external, abstract, and fragmentary is incorporated into a developing totality of
meaning. The epic poet is perhaps the first
figure in the dialectical progression of the
work who is not only an object of that principle but a user of it. In contrast with the
abstract artist who has unhappily externalized himself, the epic poet has begun the
task of recapturing what has been estranged.
Nevertheless, the epic poet, typically invoking the Muses to speak through him is
not fully aware of his own power. The identity of meaning which poetry is formally
capable of can be better realized in tragedy
which makes the tragic actor into a kind of
poet. In tragedy the action of the hero is
combined with the formative power of the
poet in the person of the tragic actor. The
artist is no longer merely implicit in the
work: tragic actors do not reproduce common or externally conceived human actions
but "they are artists" who " make the very
inner being external."13 Hegel seems to be
stressing the fact that the tragic characters
appear as artistic shapers of their own lives;
they have their own aesthetic sense of what
constitutes a glorious or heroic life which
appears in all their actions and words. Even
when overtaken by calamity they rise superior to it by giving it a poetic meaning,
often by the use of highly charged metaphorical language and extended images in
the most desperate circumstances.14
The self-conscious artist takes his own
activity more and more explicitly as a
model for humanity in general. The selfknowledge of the tragic artist is logically
prior to the Aristotelian "imitation of human action." However, the tragic actor
does not yet stand in a coherent relationship to the chorus or audience and the gods.
The chorus, which shares the audience's
spectatorial attitude toward the heroic action, is still infected with passivity in the
fact of the unfolding dramatic action; for
it, the dialectical reversals of the action
provoke pity and fear. These emotions are
the defects of tragedy (and not, as Aristotle
would have it, part of its characteristic virtue), for they reveal the persistence of an
unhappy consciousness which confronts the

objective world as something overpowering
and frustrating. These emotions are signs
of a failure of understanding which even
the artist-heroes are unable to overcome.
The persistence of the gods in tragedy is
an indication that the other two elements
in the artistic triad are also incompletely
self-conscious and so contribute to tragedy's
inconsistencies. The tragic hero's problem
is itself one of knowledge and ignorance; in
a world divided into two parts he is fully
aware only of one, and therefore even his
self-knowledge is deficient. Here's Hegel's
well-known analysis of the social structure
of the tragic world comes into play. The
tragic world is that of customary morality
raised to self-consciousness; it exhibits the
conflict of the human law of the state and
the divine law of family obligation on the
level of knowledge. In Antigone it is the
clash of the two moral tendencies, each
having its own justification, which represents the moral dilemma of the ancient
world. In his analysis of tragedy (as opposed to that of Sittlichkeit) Hegel is interested in the cognitive problems of the actors
in this moral conflict. Their ignorance is
not a merely human failing (an Aristotelian
flaw or error) but is produced by the deceptive pronouncements of the gods. (Appollo, the god of light, leads Orestes and
Oedipus into darkness by his obscure pronouncements.) In this context, the heart of
tragedy is failure of self-knowledge due to
the persistence of nature in customary
morality and the incompleteness of the artist's effort to rescue self-consciousness from
its objectification in the gods. Tragedy
shows the partiality of the various divine
powers and their reconciliation through
death or absolution, suggesting that only
the totality of these powers is real. Conceptually understood this is the notion
(Begriff); artistically, it is Zeus as a sole
deity who has shed some of his anthropomorphic traits. The gods themselves do
not generally appear on the tragic stage and
so Hegel can claim in a double sense that
tragedy "completes the depopulation of
heaven." Hegel is saying, in effect, that
Plato was right in pointing out the inconsistent role of the gods in epic and tragic
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poetry but that he failed to notice that "the
expulsion of such unreal insubstantial ideas
. . .demanded by the philosophers of antiquity, thus already has its beginning in
tragedy in general."15
The abstract necessity of tragedy is also
still external to the tragic actors. They disclose a kinship with the passive chorus: on
the one hand they are moments in the progress of the notion, but on the other they are
human beings playing a part. The object
in the artistic triad which had apparently
dropped out, leaving a direct relation between actors and audience, reappears: "The
hero, who appears before the onlookers,
breaks up into his mask and the actor into
the person of the play and the actual self."'l6
So tragedy repeats the problem of the
statue at a more complex level: the original
trichotomy of artist, work, and audience
re-emerges in such a way that the selfconsciousness of the different elements is
distinct and art still fails at its task.
The need for a new form of art at this
point should be evident, and the problems
of tragedy indicate the general character
which it will have:
The self-consciousness of the heroes must step
forth from its mask and be represented as
knowing itself to be the fate both of the gods
of the chorus and of the absolute powers themselves, and as being no longer separated from
the chorus, the universal consciousness.17

That is, the new form of art will do for the
relation between art-work and audience
what tragedy has done for that between the
artist and his work. Tragedy makes the
hero himself into an artist; comedy, the
ultimate type of art-religion, breaks down
the separation between such artist-heroes
and their audience. The clear content of
comedy is the identity of human selfconsciousness in each aspect of the artistic
triad, attained by eliminating the kind of
role which the gods play in the preceding
art-forms; since human self-consciousness is
no longer seen in such externalized form
the audience of art can see itself in the
work as does the artist who creates artistic
characters in his own image. While tragedy
reduces the divine pantheon to the single
distant figure of Zeus, comedy dethrones
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even him, and the vortex reigns in his
place. The general spirit of comedy is a
relentless turning of the negative power of
mind against anything which appears to be
fixed and substantial. Along with the gods,
the leaders of society, the philosophers, and
the notions of a substantial good and
beauty are represented as superficial, imaginary, or mere abstractions.
What particularly defines comedy, however, is the unparalleled "state of spiritual
good health" in which all of these negations
occur.18 For the spirit of comedy is to rejoice in the destruction and dissolution of
all the elements of tradition and custom
which it negates. In this respect it is the
antithesis of what Hegel calls the unhappy
consciousness: the latter is aware of itself as
self-conscious mind, but is embittered by
its sense of being radically separated from
a stable and divine self which seems to
exist quite independently. The unhappy
consciousness turns its negative power
within, supposing the impregnability of
what is external to it. In comedy selfconsciousness sees itself as being all that
there is after its negative power has overcome what was apparently external. In this
self-recognition the attitude of artist, artwork (or character), and audience reach a
happy union. The puzzles of meaning
which characterize the other forms of art
are no longer present. The comic character
cannot be sharply distinguished from the
comic actor (as could the corresponding
pair in tragedy) because both exercise the
power of ridicule and each laughs at himself as well as the world. The actor is free
to drop his mask because he stands in no
danger of being severed from his persona.
Similarly, the audience is no longer passive
but participates in the process of negation,
even if it is alternately the object as well as
the subject of laughter. In logical terms,
necessity, which appears in the enigmatic
form of fate in epic and tragedy, has become incorporated into self-consciousness
which now sees itself as both agent and
spectator, subject to no external force.
In the context of the problems of artistic
meaning which we have been pursuing,
comedy marks a culminating stage. The
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sense which artist and audience have of the
art-work is precisely the same here, and it
is so because each finds itself in the mediating element of the comic actor. Significantly
the dispensability of the comedian's mask
shows that the middle term here both is
and is not an intervening element. In a
formal sense it occupies the same position
as the abstract statue. Yet the mask can be
dropped, so as to eliminate any barrier to
identity with the audience. Hegel enforces
the point by means of a supreme pun:

tragedy still seems to be prevalent; in fact
he has attempted to show that tragedy is
an incoherent effort to establish a totality
of artistic meaning. If the preceding analysis is correct, Hegel has given what amounts
to a transcendental deduction of comedy as
the only possible way of overcoming the
dichotomies posed by our experience of
artistic intentions and interpretations.

PROBLEMS WITH IDENTITY
Hegel has told a story about art which
claims
much but is apparently open to
The religion of art is fulfilled and consummated
objections of several sorts. If viewed as a
in [comedy] and has come full circle . . . the
genuine self of the actor (Schauspieler) coinhistory of Greek art, it is undoubtedly
cides with his persona or mask (Persotn), just
highly schematic and arbitrary; while as a
as the onlooker (Zuschauer) is perfectly at home
philosophical theory about art in general it
in what is represented before him.l9
seems unduly limited by the specific charThis may be one of Hegel's most accessible acteristics of Greek art. Such objections are
presentations of his notion of identity-in- variations of the venerable criticism that
difference. It is a significant point in the Hegel's Phenomenology exhibits a systematic
larger development of his Phenomenology confusion between history and transcendenwhich has as its aim the discovery of a form tal psychology. Hegel's own style does not
of mind in which the distinction between always help to clarify the situation, and
what an attitude or form of consciousness English readers are not well-served by an
is in its own eyes and in the eyes of a wise edition which, by means of footnotes and
observer (what it is for-itself and what it is critical introductions, makes Hegel appear
for-us) collapses. What emerges finally is to be more interested in historical detail
a kind of absolute subject or privileged than does the unvarnished text. Apparently
"we" which knows that it has realized ex- Hegel (along with Schelling, Marx, and
actly what it has aimed at. Within the Nietzsche) saw Greek art as more than just
more limited context set by the problem of the product of a particular culture. What
artistic meaning we might note that Schau lends it a universal significance is the fact
or show (appearance, presentation) is the that, as Hegel elaborates in his lectures on
medium of art, as distinguished from the fine art, it tends to find the perfect fusion
more purely conceptual activity of philoso- of spiritual content with sensuous form.
phy. Art realizes its aim when one who Modern works of art may be richer in spirplays at or puts on this show is no longer itual meaning, but tend to drop their conclearly distinct from one who watches the nection with the sensuous. Hegel is also in
show. That Hegel takes this development good company in viewing Greek culture as
from abstract art to comedy to be paradig- itself fundamentally artistic insofar as it
matic for all art is confirmed by the fact exemplifies the emergence of spirit out of
that his later Lectures on Fine Art also end its natural surroundings. Plato's apparently
with comedy. There he makes it an essen- extravagant complaints about the pervasive
tial characteristic of great comedy that the effects of art (if not his analysis of the
comic characters laugh at themselves as well alleged destructive nature of these effects)
as being laughable; that is, they share the become more plausible on this view. Moreattitude of the artist and the audience.20 over, Hegel gives us an analysis which purIt has not always been noted that in Hegel's ports to show how Greek art itself makes
two major treatments of art comedy is the the transition from its more particular to
supreme or culminating form of art. The its more universal phases: this development
belief that he gave some special priority to occurs precisely because of the artist's need
III.
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to eliminate the gaps between himself, his had a significance for us (fiir-uns), has bework, and his audience. What is peculiar come aware of itself (fiir-sich).
In this paper I have not attempted to
about Greek art, Hegel might say, is not the
presence of this problem and its solution, evaluate Hegel's conception of artistic
but the direct and concentrated manner in meaning. Instead I have suggested that he
which it advanced from one to the other provides a brilliant solution to some of the
dilemmas concerning intention and interuntil it dissolved itself in laughter.
Yet Greek art, in Hegel's presentation, pretation in art which have bedeviled modseems tied to a highly specific religious in- ern aesthetics; to speak more strictly, he
terest. To regard religious art as the pat- claims (in a more modest vein) to have
tern of all art seems patently absurd if one shown that art itself is beset by these dihas any talent at all for imagining counter- lemmas and can offer solutions to them.
examples. Nevertheless, I believe Hegel can That such solutions will exhaust the rebe defended here. Hegel pictures the sources of art (and of a certain kind of
Greek artist as the inventor of the gods, as religion) is one of the melancholy ironies
Herodotus regarded Homer and Hesiod. so typical of his philosophy. To evaluate
These gods are artistic gods; they serve the Hegel's view we would need to go beyond
artist's need to create an image of pure or his analysis of art or art-religion and critiperfect self-consciousness. As soon as he cally confront his conception of consciousbegins to work with them, they lose their ness. Here the major problems bearing on
external and particular forms, while the the area we have been examining can at
artist sees that what he was seeking is in least be pointed out. They stem from two
fact exemplified in his own activity. The very central Hegelian claims (perhaps they
religion in art-religion must be conceived are assumptions of his system): (1) every
not only in terms of its more or less arbi- significant human activity tends to pass into
trary origins, but also in relation to its the theory of that activity, the theory into
self-clarifying purpose which eventually meta-theory, and so on; (2) the overriding
celebrates the death of the gods and the aim of consciousness is to reach an identity
human assumption of their place. Althouglh with its object; it will never be satisfied
from a Marxist or Nietzschean perspective with any lesser degree of relatedness. The
this may appear as a crass justification of first principle leads to the incorporation of
the bourgeois artist and his audience, Hegel the problems of aesthetics into the activity
would claim that such criticism depends on of the artist. The second principle issues
reading back into art-religion that particu- in the view that artists and audiences will
larity which it is in the process of tran- be unhappy unless their understandings of
scending. In fact the religious aspect of this art-works are completely identical. As in
art, which allows it to serve as a paradigm the more recent expressionistic theories of
for art in general, consists in its exhibition of Croce and Collingwood this leads to the
the universal pattern of Hegelian reflection. insistence that the art-work itself be simply
A;iming at the truth or the essence of things, a thought, feeling, or intuition; its apparwe tend to find it first in an apparently ently independent status must be undercut.
independent object; reflection forces us to Of these two principles, the first can proban awareness of our own self-consciousness; ably be accepted with some qualification.
but the problematic situation of self- There seems to be an ineradicable tendency
consciousness, when confronted with an for mind to reflect on its own activities,
external object leads it to seek another even if there are countless cases in which
which is truly its own. When such reflec- this tendency is not actualized. Yet in order
tion occurs in art, the result can be viewed for Hegel to establish that there is a logic
in the language of aesthetics as the identity of reflection in art (or other areas) which
of intention and interpretation; in Hegel's will lead to the kinds of conclusions he
own terminology, the purpose which was at sketches, he requires his second principle.
first merely implicit (an sich), altlhough it Here it seems to be plausible that we can
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accept relations short of identity, and even
prefer them to identity. To care truly for
another person I need not be that other
person; if I am, the structure of caring will
be destroyed. In art the artist may aim at
making something quite other than his own
activity and those who care for art may find
part of the value of that caring just in the
independence and differences of the artobject.21 It may be that Hegel has correctly
found the clue to one strand in the history
of art; accordingly, it is not surprising if
phases of abstract, minimal art are challenged by varieties of living art and these
finally overcome by a clearly meaningful
poetry. Yet alongside such histories we may
also expect to find artists who continue to
be concerned with shaping external materials and audiences for art who care for the
things made and exhibited without seeking
to incorporate them into themselves.22

11
have tried to spell out some of this structure
in "Intention and Interpretation: a Semiotic Analysis." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
(Fall, 1974).
2For Collingwood's
distinction between art and
craft, see his The Principles of Art (New York,
1958), pp. 15-41.
3 Perhaps some justification
is necessary for
treating Hegel's chapter on Kunstreligion from the
standpoint of art, and not primarily as a phase
of religion. In the structure of the Phenomenology, Kunstreligion is intermediate between the
transcendent religion of light and Christianity. In
this perspective, Hegel is clearly articulating a triadic structure of transcendent, immanent, and then
immanent and transcendent religions. J. N. Findlay,
in his Hegel: A Re-Examination (New York, 1962)
classifies Kunstreligion as one form of "Pre-Christian Religion" while admitting that it "is as much
a treatment of Greek art and literature as of
Greek religion" (p. 134). Emile Fackenheim also
stresses the religious aspect of the chapter, seeing
it as the story of a religion which gains presence
for its divinities at the cost of sacrificing their
depth. Cf. The Religious Dimension in Hegel's
Thought (Boston, 1970), p. 55. The religious orientation of Hegel's analysis is clearly important.
However, the chapter itself is about art-religion,
not simply religion. As I hope to make plausible
in the text Hegel presents the mental activity in
question as attempting to resolve problems which
in recent years have been regarded as mainly
aesthetic or artistic. When keeping the larger
context of Hegel's argument in mind, it should

not be forgotten that no form of religion is the
culmination of the Phenomenology but the state
which Hegel calls Absolute Knowledge. As an
approximation to this state, art-religion comes close
to realizing the general cognitive end of a meaning
whose purpose is completely fulfilled and in which
separations between intention and interpretation
are dissolved. A thorough justification of my
own emphasis in reading the chapter would require a more explicit study of the role of art and
the aesthetic in Hegel's philosophy than has yet
appeared; in the meantime I hope that the striking similarity between Hegel's formulation and
contemporary discussions warrants such a reading.
4G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind
(Phen.), translated by J. B. Baillie. (New York,
1961), p. 715; Phanomenologie des Geistes, Hoffmeister edition (H.), p. 495.
'Phen., p. 716; H., p. 495.
Phen., p. 705; H., p. 487.
7Phen., p. 728; H., pp. 504-505.
'Phen., p. 729; H., p. 505.
Phen., p. 730; H., p. 506.
19Logic, paragra,ph 115.
"Phen., p. 735; H., p. 509.
"Phen., p. 735; H., p. 510.
13Phen., p. 737; H., p. 511.
14 Cf.
Hegel's Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art,
translated by T. M. Knox (London, 1975), vol. I,
pp. 416-421. Except in this case, Hegel takes metaphor and symbolism to be inadequate modes for
poetry because they merely suggest ambiguous
meaning rather than expressing dialectical content,
as does the best poetry. I have explored the contrast between dialectical and symbolic meaning in
"Hegel on the Meanings of Poetry," Philosophy
and Rhetoric, Spring, 1975.
"Phen., p. 743; H., p. 516.
'6Phen., p. 745; H., p. 517. The frequent praise
and criticism of Hegel's "theory" of tragedy have
led to some neglect of this section of his Phenomenology, which attempts to demonstrate the inconsistency of the tragic form. In a recent essay,
Walter Kaufmann has offered a healthy corrective
to this tradition by claiming that Hegel has no
theory of tragedy; apparently in opposition to A.
C. Bradley's famous "'Hegel's Theory of Tragedy,"
Kaufmann calls his essay "Hegel's Ideas About
Tragedy." Cf. Warren Steinkraus, ed. New Studies
in Hegel's Philosophy (New York, 1971), esp. pp.
201 and 211. Kaufmann's denial is useful in reminding us that Hegel has no independent theory
of tragedy as such; the reason for this, however,
does not seem to be Hegel's alleged empiricism
which would prevent him from subsuming the
facts of tragedy under any "Procrustean" theory.
It is rather that Hegel in each of the places
where he writes or talks about tragedy has some
more general philosophical end than defining a
literary genre. It is not that Hegel abandons an
interest in theory to an absorption in the variety
of the facts (although Hegel's respect for the
contingent and empirical is often neglected), but
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that his theoretical interests have to do with how
art can approach the goal of Absolute Knowledge.
In general, there is a need for greater attention to
the systematic context of Hegel's utterances about
art. For example, Kaufmann cites as the "fatal
flaw" of Hegel's treatment of tragedy the view
that every tragedy involves two equally justified
sides. The Hegelian text which most closely supports such a view is the treatment of customary
morality
(Sittlichkeit) in the Phenomenology.
Hegel uses Antigone to throw light on the contradictions of a certain ethical-social arrangement.
But here Hegel's subject is not tragedy as such,
but tragedy as illustlrative of ethical-social problems! When he considers tragedy in the chapter
on Kunstreligion it is the problems of tragic
knowledge and the incoherence of the actors' role
with which he is concerned.
"Phen., p. 745; H., p. 517.
18 Phen., p. 749; H., p. 520.
19Phen., p. 748; H., p. 520. (I have slightly
altered Baillie's translation.) Findlay stresses the
sense of loss and the reappearance of the unhappy
consciousness in comedy (Hegel: A Re-examination,
p. 137). Yet, given Hegel's dialectic, it is also in
keeping for him to describe the comic attitude as
an "unparalleled state of spiritual good health"
and to have consistent praise for Aristophanes.
Jacob Loewenberg is the only Hegel scholar I
have encountered who consistently sees that there
is a very important sense in which, for Hegel,
comedy is a deeper form of art than tragedy. He
has also suggested that the comic complacency in
the face of contradiction and dissolution is very
close both to the spirit of Hegel's dialectic and to
the procedure of the Phenomenology in particu-

35
lar. See Hegel's Phenomenology (LaSalle, Illinois,
1965), pp. 326-333, esp. 331-2.
20 Hegel's
Aesthetics, vol. II, pp. 1233-1236.
There are major differences in the scope and
organization of Hegel's chapter on Kunstreligion
and his later and long course of lectures. However, it seems to me that the relatively schematic
dialectical structure of the Kunstreligion chapter
supplies a crucial perspective on the argument of
the lectures. The latter, encompassing as they do
the art of the Oriental world, Greece, Rome, the
middle ages, and modern times, are filled with
empirical detail. It may also have happened that
some of Hegel's argument has been lost in the
course of transcription by his students. So despite
the great wealth of its contents, the following conclusion of the lectures may appear to be obscure
unless it is supplemented by attending to Hegel's
account of the problems of intention and interpretation in the Phenomenology:
Comedy leads at the same time to the dissolution of art altogether. All art aims at the
identity, produced by the spirit, in which eternal
things, God, and absolute truth are revealed in
real appearance and shape to our contemplation,
to our hearts allnd minds (Hegel's Aesthetics,
vol. II, p. 1236).
21 Cf. Albert
Hofstadter's critique of Hegel's
conception of identity in "Ownness and Identity:
Re-thinking Hegel," Review of Metaphysics, June
1975.
22 Work on this paper was assisted by Kansas
University Research Grant 3744-5038. I'm grateful
to the editor and referee of this journal for some
helpful suggestions.
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